BY: ABACUS REVEALS

After coming up just 90’ short in their 2014 quest for a championship  – owing much to both the starting and relieving brilliance of one man – the Kansas City Royals battled their way back to baseball’s biggest stage. A key cog in this Middle America Revival story has been manager Ned Yost’s bullpen crew. On the Royal Blue-print, the three-headed closing monster of Herrera-Davis-Holland is virtually an everyday “player.”

In 2015, KC’s relief corps witnessed but two Complete Game (CG) performances from the rotation guys. Those starters, moreover, pitched 7+ innings in only 35 outings, second fewest Long Starts (LS) in the league (No. 23 in MLB). In spite of such regularity of work, a Royal relief pitcher was charged with a losing decision on a mere 15 occasions, contrasted with 30 bullpen victories. That .667 winning percentage was tops among MLB relief staffs for 2015.

That last little piece of data might invite dismissal of the contribution of the team’s starting pitchers, especially given the mediocre returns (just four Royal triumphs in his 13 starts) on the late-season acquisition Johnny Cueto. But those starters posted victories at a .556 clip, which would still have won their division and been second only to Toronto in the AL.

The Royals’ World Series foe from Gotham City, with its rotation full of hard-throwing young arms, produced an almost identical starting-pitcher-showing as KC – NY: 64-51; KC: 65-52. The record of the Mets’ bullpen guys was a respectable 26-21, in the same 55 percent range as the rotation.

But Mets’ skipper Terry Collins had access to five starting pitchers who delivered at least nine LS’s – and that doesn’t include his Game 4 starter Steven Matz. (Oddly, the staff’s lone CG belongs to old geezer Bartolo Colon.) NY led the NL with 62 LS’s on the season (No. 3 overall).

Pro forma, Met starters earned the decisions of eight games during their 7-2 postseason path to the Finals. Conversely, a Royal bullpen pitcher had snatched five of their seven victories while incurring none of the four setbacks.

Both the Royals’ and Mets’ relievers fell into the bottom quadrant (No. 25 and 22, respectively) in rate of deciding games, well below MLB’s overall 31 percent – 1,495 No Decisions in 4,858 starting assignments. Tampa Bay’s bullpen got the decision in two out of five Ray games. The resurgent Cubs were next in line at a 39 percent rate of relief decisions. The least decisive ‘pen-men resided in Cleveland (just under 20 percent), Milwaukee and San Francisco (both at 23.5 percent).

Five relief crews could brag of a .600 winning rate for the season – the Brewers (.605), Angels (.612), Orioles (.620) and Pirates (.633) trail KC on the list. The bottom-feeders are Seattle (.368), Oakland (.404) and the Reds (.426). MLB bullpens as a whole finished 2015 27 games above .500 – 761-734 (.509). NL relief-men (.517) handily outperformed their AL (.501) brethren.

These contrasting philosophies regarding the construction and usage of a championship pitching staff offered to us in the 2015 Fall Classic have induced a thought from my second cousin and alter-ego, Horatio N. Proportion.

Consider two factors: (a) the case when the starting pitcher works deep into a game and (b) the starting pitcher’s non-involvement in the decision … LS’s and ND’s. (NB: these two events are NOT mutually exclusive – either, both or neither may occur in any game.)

Like “assist-to-turnover in basketball, let’s create the “LS-to-ND” ratio.

By this simple calculation, the Mets (1.319), followed closely by the perennially pitching-potent Cardinals (1.250), grade out best in the senior circuit and Top Five overall. NL playoff qualifiers Pittsburgh and the Dodgers likewise rank in baseball’s Top Ten.

On the other hand, Kansas City (who, let’s remember, opted not to retain a noted Long Starter in James Shields after 2014’s near-miss) sports the AL’s second worst score (.778), just behind the wild-card Yankees. Indeed, the only AL playoff qualifier with more LS’s than ND’s was Toronto (57:48, 1.188, No.5 in MLB).

To recap, four of the five AL playoff qualifiers posted a mediocre or worse LS : ND score; four of the five NL squads were MLB Top Ten. Such an anything-but-normal distribution defies both logic and the data. NL starters logged 646 LS’s and 751 ND’s, a ratio of .860. AL arms produced a near equivalent 744 ND’s, but 95 more LS’s and thus a near one-to-one ratio (.996).

Sometimes, things just don’t seem to add up – even when your Math is right. For instance, Toronto is joined in the AL Top Five by Detroit (1.104), Boston (1.186), Chicago (1.308) and Cleveland (2.031). (In the midst of an otherwise disastrous season, the Indians’ rotation did play an entertaining little game of “Can You Top This?” with CG’s for a week or so in late July.)

A logical pattern can be discerned in this data: the full-season scores of 21 teams decreased from what they’d been at the All-Star Break. Understandably, a regular starter’s endurance can be expected to wane over the course of a long season – Cleveland’s out-of-proportion showing was even more extreme (38:12, above three-to-one) at mid-season.

One final thought on the LS : ND ratio. Since these are two statistics compiled independent of the outcome of any game, perhaps what the scores reveal to us is an organization’s “Blue Print” for success on the pitching front. Little surprise, wouldn’t you say, that the Nationals’ stacked rotation finished in this Top Ten.

And skippers as far back as Sparky “Captain Hook” Anderson with the Big Red Machine of the ‘70’s have been playing a match-up zone defense with their bullpens – noted Scribe Bob Ryan has frequently and disdainfully bemoaned such tactics as “Creeping LaRussa-ism.”

Of course, back in those pre-historic times, if anybody had conjured up such a “metric,” they’d have used the Complete Game rather than the Long Start as the standard of excellence.

My thoughts on this season’s individual starting pitcher performances can be glimpsed here.

BY: ABACUS REVEALS

​The San Francisco Giants’ Madison Bumgarner was the break-out star of the 2014 World Series – or MLB Finals, as ESPN’s Keith Olbermann has taken to calling it. The big country boy has been a mainstay, indeed a work-horse, in Bruce Bochy’s rotation now for four seasons, logging 129 regular-season starts, roughly half of the seven-inning variety. The acclaim he is receiving is bought and paid for.

As eye-popping as was the performance of the Giants’ lefty, though, the real winner to come out of this post-season was the game of Baseball itself, particularly as represented by the “small-ball” style of the frumpy runners-up from the Midwest. Ned Yost’s No-Name Kansas City Royals rode the tripartite mantra of Pitching (particularly a shut-down bullpen crew), Defense and “Get ‘em on, get ‘em over, get ‘em in” to its best finish in two decades.

Regal Reality seemed to have set in, however, against battle-tested Jon Lester and the Oakland A’s in the Wild Card play-in game. But a miraculous rally saved the day and ignited a clean sweep through the American League side of the playoff bracket. Bumgarner’s gem in Game 1 of the Fall Classic stemmed the tide only temporarily, as consecutive KC triumphs snatched back the home-field advantage, which held true until Game 7.

Maybe in a case of role reversal, the Giants stole a page from Yost’s playbook in forging an early 3-2 lead in that decisive game. For example, just prior to scoring what would prove to be the championship run from third base on Mike Morse’s fourth-inning single to right, Pablo Sandoval had advanced to third on an outfield fly – TO LEFT. The Panda’s rather a big boy to be executing such daring base-running, eh? SF’s first two runs had been scored on sacrifice flies … indeed, four of the twelve base advancements it took to plate three runners were the result of a tag-up.

Put the ball in play and good things can happen!

During the second inning of a “do-or-die” Game 6, a dribbler off the bat of speedy KC shortstop Alcides Escobar made grizzled vet Jake Peavy and young first baseman Brandon Belt look like a couple of T-ballers. The infield single (no, fielder’s choice; yes, single again) begat a seven-run inning, a 10-0 blowout and that Game 7.

Certainly, Iron Man Bumgarner’s long relief creates the enduring impression for this Series. But Baseball’s extraordinary capacity for innovation had saved up one final edge-of-your-seat moment for us – on a play that could have laid waste to MadBum’s chunk of posterity.

‘Twas fitting that this one ended with the tying run a mere 90’ away. And the manner by which Alex Gordon got himself into that position soon had the irascibly witty Olbermann invoking the likes of legendary Giant goats Fred Snodgrass (he of the “muff”) and Fred Merkle (he of the “boner”).

The Royals’ wonderfully athletic left-fielder whistled an 0-1 slider right up the middle on a line, under most circumstances a playable, if not catchable, ball for a proficient center-fielder like Gregor Blanco. But the Giants were utilizing the so-called “No Doubles” alignment as well as playing the left-handed hitting Gordon to pull. Blanco got himself into No Man’s Land, and the ball skipped through to the wall.

Left-fielder Juan Perez complicated matters by mishandling the ball before getting it to shortstop Brandon Crawford in short left field.

Over and above the misjudgment and poor ball-handling, this outfield play is fundamentally un-sound. The corner outfielder is expected to serve as the backer-upper, not the chaser-downer. What in the world was Perez thinking? That he had a play on the ball? Or did he figure Blanco had it all the way and was guilty of pre-mature jockularity, as seemed to be the case with the Giants’ battery at that point in time?

Either way, and notwithstanding the error properly charged to Blanco, Perez’s mental miscue cost at least one base, if not two. The Keystone Kops component of it all was advanced by the pundits who were chastising Gordon and third-base coach Mike Jirschole for not further testing the Giants’ capacity for foible by trying for the game evener right then and there.

Of course, such base-running judgment would be the epitome of folly. No way Gordon could have navigated those final 90’ more quickly than Crawford can throw a ball 120’ or so. In prior baseball eras, one might factor into this decision the likelihood that Gordon, who’s built like a blocking back, could have jarred the ball loose from the grasp of catcher Buster Posey. But such collisions have been legislated from the rulebook, if not quite completely yet from the instinctive nature of aggressive ballplayers.

A payoff (i.e. tie game, extra innings, no more Bumgarner) on such a long-shot required another defensive blunder (i.e. off-line or delayed throw, another player out-of-place). Methinks I recall a famous line from “Dirty Harry” that fits such a scenario. Of course, Det. Callahan’s sentiment might just as easily have applied to the prospects of Salvador Perez’s subsequent at-bat. And therein lies the dilemma that was facing Gordon and particularly Jirschole in that most tense of moments.

There are a variety of ways by which a base-runner can advance from third to home: a batted ball in play, a balk, a pitch that goes awry, even a straight steal of home ala Jackie Robinson. All things considered, holding the runner was the only move to make, and both runner and base-coach seemed to resign themselves to this inevitability. (Gordon, in violation of youth ball gospel, admitted to watching the ball while running.)

Conceivably, the Royals could have bluffed Crawford into making a hurried throw without actually sending Gordon. An aggressive rounding of third may have induced such a reaction. But Jirschole put the brakes on Gordon well before reaching the bag.

Kinda ironic that on such a crucial play, two teams who had made their 2014 mark with a “balls-out” approach ultimately went conservative – the Giants with their defensive alignment and the Royals (who uncharacteristically attempted only two stolen bases in the whole series) with some too casual base-running.

In the end, Madison’s magnificence made it all a moot point by inducing the least stressful out in the sport, a foul pop. And let’s hope that Kung Fu Panda’s last act as a San Francisco Giant is NOT falling on his keister.

BY: ABACUS REVEALS

The recognition of personal achievement in a team sport is always a tricky proposition – Most Valuable Players, Most Outstanding Performers, fodder for countless debates, many of them everlasting.

Certain measureable accomplishments are indeed undeniable. Ted Williams is the last major-leaguer to hit .400 for an entire season. No pitcher since Denny McLain in 1968 has rung up 30 wins in a season. Like it or not, Barry Bonds does hold a couple of MLB’s Home Run records.

Of course, even in matters measureable, MLB itself showed us over half a century ago what a little asterisk can do. And Miguel Cabrera’s Triple Crown in 2012 was thought by some to be undeserving of an MVP.

Nevertheless, individual awards are still regularly presented – and new ones invented. Fans, numerologists and sabermetricians have been slicing and dicing the data since Doubleday (or whoever) first laid out some bases in a pasture. Statistics are merely tallies of the occurrences of specific events. Blend in a little “long division” for the sake of ratio and proportion. And Presto – averages and percentages emerge, custom-made for comparing and combining (can you spell OPS?).

Baseball presents us with a series of compelling individual confrontations – at times on multiple levels – within the framework of a consolidated team effort. And none of this occurs – except perhaps for some exceptionally daring base-running – until the pitcher makes a purposeful release of the ball. The impetus for avoiding a loss, one might say, rests in his hand.

Funny how little impact (none at all, by American League rules) this guy has in the actual winning of a game. His job is to register outs, in batches of three, with minimal bleeding for as long as necessary/able. A team victory (or, better yet, the avoidance of a team defeat) is the ultimate objective, a winning decision a pleasant accoutrement.

So let’s see if we can construct a simple mathematical formula that will reward a pitcher for working deep into a game while holding him accountable for the outcome. We’ll penalize a pitcher for each of his starting assignments that the team ultimately loses, and impose an additional down-grade for each losing decision in a start. On the other hand, we’ll recognize each start (win or lose) that spans a full seven innings or more, and additionally reward all Complete Games.

[(Long Starts + Complete Games) – (Player Losses + Team Losses)] / Starts

Here’s how this would work. Pitcher “A” compiled 35 starts, 16 Complete Games, 26 “Long Starts” and a 25-3 record. His team lost but five of those games. The equation becomes: [(26 + 16) – (3 + 5)] / 35 = [42 – 8] / 35 = 34 / 35 = 0.971. Those familiar stats suggest a productive year – and “Point Nine Seven One” does sound impressive, huh?

Let’s consider two other seasons. Pitcher “B” posted 34 starts, five CG’s, 26 LS’s, a 19-9 record and 11 team losses: [(26 + 5) – (9 + 11) / 34 = [31 – 20] / 34 = 11 / 34 = 0.324. Pitcher “C” went 27-10 in 41 starts

with 30 CG’s, 37 LS’s and only 12 team losses: [(37 + 30) – (10 + 12)] / 41 = [67 – 22] / 41 = 45 / 41 = 1.098.

That quite a body of work – 110 games and 82 victories, 71-22 combined, over three-fourths of them “long” and nearly half “complete.” Cy Young-worthy, for sure…though Pitcher “B” fell short last year to the Dodgers’ Clayton Kershaw.

Nevertheless, the 0.324 grade recorded for the 2013 season by St. Louis ace Adam Wainwright topped MLB among all 127 pitchers with a minimum of 20 starting assignments. (Kershaw was second.)

Curiously, two pitchers received the score of an even “zero” on this scale – Patrick Corbin of Arizona and Tampa Bay’s David Price. (Corbin lost his 2014 season to the Tommy-John plague.) Even more curiously, this unimpressive little number placed both guys in MLB’s Top Ten (tied at No. 8), a group that includes the Mariners’ Hisashi Iwakuma at -0.030. (The lowest score, -1.200, belonged to journeyman Joe Blanton of the Angels, one of six players who graded out at -1.000 or lower.)

You see, just as winning percentages and batting averages work on a scale (0.000-1.000), this calculation has both an upper and lower limit. Hypothetically, a pitcher’s team could find a way not to lose every game he starts; hypothetically, a pitcher could throw every pitch of every game he starts – combine those hypotheticals and we get a perfect score, 2.000. Conversely, no LS’s or CG’s combined with all losing decisions creates the numerical bottom of the barrel, -2.000. (Out of last season’s pool of 127, the performance of 112 regular starters produced a value between zero and negative one on this scale.)

Alternative Approach

While the following numerical nuance may not necessarily fit the philosophical loss-avoidance nature of the pitching profession, we can modify the calculation in order to produce more user-friendly data (i.e. values greater than zero). Rather than using a player’s combined losses (individual and team), add his combined wins to the CG’s and LS’s. The subsequent division by the total starts will yield a value between zero and four.

A ranking by this “metric” gives us a similar though hardly identical set of results. For example, Wainwright’s score of 2.118 remains atop last season’s heap, but Cy Young recipient Kershaw falls to No. 4 at 1.909 behind the Nationals’ Jordan Zimmerman (2.000) and Detroit’s Max Scherzer (2.031).

Scherzer is one of several players whose ranking induces some head-scratching. That second-best showing by the new equation drops to No. 38 on the original scale (-0.281).

This modified calculation does produce a wider range of scores, from a high of 2.118 to a low of 0.350 – 1.768, as compared to 1.524.

We’ll see how all this compares with the 2014 data when all that mathematical grunt work is done.

Who the Heck Are Pitchers “A” & “C”, Anyway?

Those guys are, respectively, the 1978 version of the Yankees’ Ron Guidry and Steve Carlton, vintage 1972, for his incomprehensible season with miserable (59-97) Philadelphia Phillies.

And for the record, their numbers are surpassed by the 1968 accomplishments of a couple of guys named Bob Gibson and the previously-referenced McLain.

BY: ABACUS REVEALS

In the same way that a 25-year playing career seems a footnote in the life of the pitcher after whom Tommy John surgery is named, two-time Cy Young Award recipient Johann Santana may become best remembered as the pitcher whose cautionary tale drove the final nail into the coffin of the Complete Game in major league pitching.

Through 11 weeks and 1,032 games, MLB pitchers have been permitted to deliver 46 Complete Game performances, over half (27) of which have been shut-outs (including Josh Beckett’s first career no-hitter last month). Cincinnati’s Johnny Cueto and the Marlins’ Henderson Alvarez, with three apiece, top a list of nine pitchers with multiple Complete Games.

Last season saw 124 MLB complete games, the second-fewest ever – one CG for every 19.6 games. The worst performance occurred in 2007 (112 CG’s), when the ratio was one for every 21.7 games. Currently, an MLB CG is thrown once in every 22.4 games, on pace for an all-time low of 108.

Here’s some historical perspective for these numbers. In 1988, there were 622 CG’s, one for every 3.4 games; in ’68, the total was 889 CG’s and the ratio 1 : 1.8; in ’48, 797 CG’s, 1 : 1.5; in 1928, 1172 CG’s, 1 : 1.1. A hundred years ago, the total of CG’s exceeded the number of games.

Alvarez is a study in contrasts to this point. While his three Shut-outs lead the majors, he is tied with teammate Nathan Eovaldi for the NL lead in the dubious category of No-Decision starts with eight, one “behind” Boston’s Jake Peavy. Yet Alvarez has lasted seven innings or more in but five of his fourteen starts.

Pitchers Who’ll Take You Deep 

While the Complete Game dwindles toward extinction, the seven-inning-start is becoming a new standard of (if not excellence) commendation. In 2014, 595 of the 2064 starting assignments through June 15 have qualified, 29 percent, once for every 1.7 games.

Adam Wainwright of the Cardinals leads the majors with 11 such long starts, while four others have delivered 10 such outings. Here are the best so far in this category, ranked by percentage:

1. Tim Hudson (San Francisco Giants) 10 – 12 [83%]

2. Adam Wainwright (St. Louis Cardinals) 11 – 14 [79%]

3. Hisashi Iwakuma (Seattle Mariners) 7 – 9 [78%]

4. Yu Darvish (Texas Rangers) 9 – 12 [75%]

5. Johnny Cueto (Cincinnati Reds) 10 – 14 [71%]

6. Cole Hamels (Philadelphia Phillies) 7 – 10 [70%]

7. Felix Hernandez (Seattle Mariners) 10 – 15 [67%]

8. David Price (Tampa Bay Rays) 10 – 15 [67%]

9. Chris Sale (Chicago White Sox) 6 – 9 [67%]

10. Jaime Garcia (St. Louis Cardinals) 4 – 6 [67%]

In all, 226 different pitchers have “taken the bump” at least once to start an MLB game this season, 172 have started at least five games, 116 at least ten games.

Through Sunday, teams had play an average of 69 games each – that’s fourteen times through a five man rotation. While a rash of season-ending injuries have justifiably raised concerns and grabbed headlines, there have been 65 pitchers who have not yet missed an assignment, posting 14 or more starts.

Most Valuable Starting Pitchers 

Not every .500 pitcher is created equal. A .500 pitcher on a team playing .400 ball overall is an asset. For a contender on a .600 pace, such a starter is likely to be concerned for his spot in the rotation. The former is clearly more valuable to his team.

With that in mind, let’s look at a measurement to evaluate a starting pitcher’s contribution to his team’s overall performance.

We'll identify the pitcher's won-loss record in his starts (decisions from relief appearances not allowed), as well as the team's record in all starts (including his No-Decisions). Simply take the average of these two percentages; then just subtract the team's final winning percentage.

Consideration will be limited to pitchers with a minimum of 10 games started.

Example A: 15 starts -- player (5-6, .455), team (8-7, .533); team overall (27-43, .386). So, the equation becomes: [(455 + 533) / 2] - 386 = 494 - 386 = +108. {David Price, Tampa Bay}

Example B: 14 starts -- player (6-5, .545), team (7-7, .500); team overall (33-35, .485). The calculation this time: {(545 + 500) / 2} - 485 = 523 - 485 = +38. {Johnny Cueto, Cincinnati}

American League

1. Masahiro Tanaka (New York Yankees): +363

2. Yu Darvish (Texas Rangers) +313

3. Phil Hughes (Minnesota Twins) + 296

4. Dallas Keuchel (Houston Astros) +258

5. Felix Hernandez (Seattle Mariners) + 227

6. Scott Kazmir (Oakland A’s) +220

7. Max Scherzer (Detroit Tigers) +203

8. James Shields (Kansas City Royals) +201

9. Mark Buehrle (Toronto Blue Jays) + 201

10. Garrett Richards (LA Angels) +188

National League

1. Alfredo Simon (Cincinnati Reds) +275

2. Adam Wainwright (St. Louis Cardinals) +232

3. Tim Hudson (San Francisco Giants) + 192

4. Bronson Arroyo (Arizona Diamondbacks) +187

5. Jordan Lyles (Colorado Rockies) + 174

6. Gerrit Cole (Pittsburgh Pirates) +174

7. Kyle Lohse (Milwaukee Brewers) +160

8. Travis Wood (Chicago Cubs) +158

9. Homer Bailey (Cincinnati Reds) +151

10. Jason Hammel (Chicago Cubs) +151

Apres le Deluge

For this entire decade, the Astros have been historically bad . And while Houston’s Minute Maid (Don’t Call Me “Enron”) Park will need to wait a bit longer to witness playoff action, the farm system has been churning out major-league-level starting pitching for some time now. Starts from the home-grown pair of Dallas Keuchel and Jarred Cosart account for half this season’s 32 wins. The likes of Wandy Rodriguez (Pittsburgh), Bud Norris (Baltimore) and Jordan Lyles (Colorado) have been providing solid service in other locales.

Laissez les Bon Temps Rouler!

BY: KWAME FISHER-JONES

​No longer viewed as the most popular sport in the United States, the game known as “America’s Pastime” remains America’s most rebellious conundrum. Since its inception, professional baseball has basked in the light given to players who are a reflection of a flawed society, however, yesterday the game’s caretakers decided to continue to embrace their most detested players while shunning its most emphatic players.

Major League Baseball has long attempted to distance itself from a storied past of tolerated racism, while capitalizing mightily on the feats of the very same racists. The transgressions and verbiage of former Detroit Tiger and Philadelphia Athletic Ty Cobb have been pardoned under the “product of his environment” defense. Babe Ruth is widely regarded as the game’s greatest hitter, despite facing specific and racially selected opposition. 
 
Those two are baseball’s biggest pillars; more importantly, Cobb and Ruth were the biggest benefactors of “selective service.” Would Ruth, or Cobb for that matter, have comprised such an impressive resume if standing before them were the likes of Smokey Joe Williams who posted a 20-7 record in “barnstorming exhibitions” including at least one no-hitter. Bill “Cannonball” Jackman who ruled the segregated New England sandlots where Negros played. One cannot forget the likes of John Donaldson, the arsenal of Willie Foster, and the incomparable Satchel Page.

Most historians agree, pitching while great in the Caucasian league, paled in comparison to the everyday pitching in the Negro league. On MLB’s very own website these words are on display “As great as Christy Mathewson, Walter Johnson, Cy Young, Addie Joss and Lefty Grove were, each had his equal, if not his superior, in black baseball.”

Many if not all of Baseball’s Hall-of-Fame members who played until the 1950’s rest comfortably in the game’s most cherished destination, despite amassing numbers in a watered down league voided of the world’s best. Speculation and disdain do not accompany these players and they should not, their exploits while set in the most despicable of settings should be honored.

The game of baseball reflects our beauty as a country, as well as our blemishes as countrymen. No man walking this surface is perfect, therefore perfection should not be bestowed upon them, and while it is difficult to accept the decisions of some of the games magnificent, we as a society must forgive them.

It is paramount that the lessons of baseball’s forefathers be a tutorial for the game of life, in conjunction with the game of baseball. Fans were robbed of watching the aforementioned Satchel Page and his unhittable fastball meet the likes of Cobb, just as we were robbed of watching the great Josh Gibson get his chance to slaughter a Lefty Grove pitch. 

The stubbornness of man is what deprived us of these epic battles, and just as today’s “purest” claim to have the Pastime’s best interest at heart, it is their own scorn that sits prominently in the way of progression. 
  
Just as Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis (baseball’s first Commissioner) led the egregious unwritten law of refusing to allow the game’s most skilled combatants the privilege of competing against each other regardless of race, the Hall’s voters are blocking the game’s best from their rightful resting place. Their logic, much like Judge Landis’, is reluctance to acceptance.

Landis’ refusal to allow Negro ballplayers in MLB cannot just be charged to unbridled hate and racism, while very easy to do so. Landis’issue was bitter scorn, incogitable arrogance married to fear. It was bitter scorn for those who pursued contrast from the accepted norm and a fear that this behavior or action would destroy the utopia Landis ruled over. 

It was Landis’ arrogance, and perhaps a slight god complex, that compelled the Commissioner to have a sit down with Black Newspapers Publishers Association. Landis accompanied by every owner in the Majors sat and listened to prominent black writers explain the necessity of having Black ballplayers in the Majors. In fact, it was Landis who gave a thoughtful speech when presenting singer-activist Paul Robeson calling him “a great American.”  

However, it was not until the Judge’s death that Jackie Robinson would break the National League color line. There is no written proof that during Commissioner Landis’ reign Black ballplayers were not allowed in major league baseball, there is just the fact that none played. 
 
It appears Landis’ selective judgment has resurfaced in the form of the current Hall-of-Fame gatekeepers, and once again the emotion those men used in justifying their most recent decision is just as estranged from logic. 
  
Barry Bonds’ records, Mark McGwire’s records, and Roger Clemens’ records are just as flawed as any other player’s achievements during segregated play. Just as we have welcomed and championed those players from yesterday, the same jubilee should be displayed for today’s players.

All of these men were and are supremely flawed and drastically imperfect. Bonds just like Ruth destroyed inferior opponents with superior talent, and Ruth just like Bonds benefited by “selective competition”. The difference is Bonds benefited from substance, while Ruth benefited from segregation.

The circumstances surrounding Bonds are heinous and surely conjure doubt, but suspicion is not truth and should never trump fact.

The fact remains that Bonds, Clemens, and McGwire dominated their era and deserve a seat next to other players who used hideous circumstances to dominate theirs. 

​It was Landis who blocked integration and consequently created an atmosphere that congratulated the ends, while enthusiastically disregarding the means. Here we sit almost one hundred years later, attempting to play god yet again.

His-story has accepted the flaws of segregation and the results of that time period. The precedent has been set and unless his-story plans on removing every player who used anything from the ridiculous to the grotesque to aid them in their pursuit of greatness, now is not the time to repeat “selective service.” 

The definition of a Hall-of-Fame player is simple; a player judged outstanding in their sport. Barry Bonds by definition is a Hall-of-Fame baseball player, just as Babe Ruth is. Roger Clemens by definition is a Hall-of-Fame baseball player, just as Ty Cobb is. 
 
If judged by the merits of their play these players deserve a chance to rest alongside the best in game. Unfortunately, someone or some people have decided that their play is not how they should be judged. Just as Landis used an unwritten code to keep the game “pure”, today’s writers have used an unwritten code to keep the hall “pure.”

Following in the footsteps of pioneering sportswriter Wendell Smith, we must fight this injustice, and let field of play be the only deciding factor. After all we can forgive Cobb, Landis and Ruth, but only those who are a glutton will forget them.

BY: ABACUS REVEALS

The passage of Labor Day marks both the de-facto end of summer as well as the point at which the “home stretch” of a long MLB schedule turns into a “mad dash” for the teams still in realistic playoff contention…and Commissioner Bud Selig will be happy to inform you that currently numbers 15 teams.

At this juncture, when a starting pitcher has five or six rotation turns remaining, can you guess which MLB pitcher has accumulated the most “winning starts”? Are you surprised that the Nationals’ Gio Gonzalez is the game’s most reliable “stopper”?

WINS

20: Gonzalez

19: Johnny Cueto, Cincinnat1; R.A. Dickey, NY Mets; Kyle Lohse, St. Louis; Stephen Strasburg, Washington; Jered Weaver, LA Angels.

18: A.J. Burnett, Pittsburgh; Matt Cain, San Francisco; Yovani Gallardo, Milwaukee; Clayton Kershaw, LA Dodgers; Max Scherzer, Detroit; James Shields, Tampa Bay.

All but Dickey and Gallardo are in the playoff picture. (No post-season for young Mr. Strasburg either, ‘twould seem.)

So, how ‘bout the most frequent losers?

LOSSES

18: Henderson Alvarez, Toronto; Tin Lincecum, San Francisco; Wandy Rodriguez, Houston/Pittsburgh.

17: Bruce Chen, Kansas City; Jordan Lyles, Houston; Kevin Millwood, Seattle; Randy Wolf, Milwaukee/Baltimore.

16: Lucas Harrell, Houston; Ubaldo Jimenez, Cleveland; Jon Lester, Boston; Bud Norris, Houston; Ricky Romero, Toronto; Anibal Sanchez, Miami/Detroit.

It’s no surprise that Houston’s (Dis)Astros are well represented here. (Side note to those locals protesting the ‘Stros transfer to the A.L. West—be grateful y’all aren’t joining Roger and the Skeeters in the Freedom Division of the Atlantic League.)

Of course, the above rankings include games in which the starter did not receive a decision. Doesn’t that make you wonder which guys have racked up the most “No Decision” starts?

NO DECISIONS

13: Cliff Lee, Philadelphia.

12: Mat Latos, Cincinnati; Lohse.

11: Marco Estrada, Milwaukee; Zack Greinke, Milwaukee/LA Angels; Mike Leake, Cincinnati; Wolf.

10: Jordan Zimmerman, Washington; Millwood.

It’s tempting to view N.D.’s unflatteringly, though many factors can be involved. For example, though leading the majors in so dubious a category, the Phillies’ Lee still rates among the games most durable “ironmen.” In his 56 starts over two seasons since joining Charlie Manuel’s rotation, Lee has pitched at least seven innings on 41 occasions, a 73.2 percent clip. Indeed, eight of those 13 N.D.’s this season were “long” outings.

Here are 2012’s leaders in LONG (seven-inning) STARTS.

20: Felix Hernandez, Seattle.

19: David Price, Tampa bay; Cueto.

18: Justin Verlander, Detroit; Dickey; Kershaw.

17: Cole Hamels, Philadelphia; Hiroki Kuroda, NY Yankees; Lee.

Additionally, only Lee, Cueto, Dickey, Hernandez, Kershaw, Price and the Yankees’ CC Sabathia have notched a Long Start in a full two-thirds of their games. Incidentally, that group has an average age of 29.4, ranging from 24 (Kershaw) to 37 (Dickey).

Finally, with Joe Saunders’s veteran presence joining Baltimore’s rotation last week, that makes 16 pitchers who’ve started games for two MLB teams this season. That total is up from only nine such players in 2011.

The biggest name to change pitching rotations last year was Jimenez, while the most useful acquisitions were Doug Fister by the Tigers and Edwin Jackson by St. Louis (now a likely 30-start guy for the up-and-coming Nationals).

This season’s shuffling has brought Josh Beckett, Joe Blanton and Greinke to LA, has sent Canadian Ryan Dempster to the heart (and heat) of Texas, and has even got the Pirates listed as buyers for the first time in generations.

Poor Jason Marquis seems stuck in a rut. He’s the only guy in baseball to throw the first pitch of a game for four separate teams in the last two years. He also is in danger of wrapping up his second consecutive season on the Disabled List for an injury that has nothing whatsoever to do with his pitching arm.

In his third 2011 start for the contending Arizona Diamondbacks (who’d acquired him at the trading deadline), a batted ball off his leg ended his season. Then last month in his 15th start for the decidedly not-contending San Diego Padres, another batted ball broke a bone in his non-pitching hand. Ouch!

Considering that the Padres have used 15 different starting pitchers—the most in MLB—Jason’s turn may just not come up again.

Selig’s new playoff system ensures us at least two “do-or-die” Wild Card games. Do you suppose any teams—Texas, Washington, Cincinnati—are already arranging their playoff rotations? It shouldn’t be too much work for Dusty Baker; his five-man rotation has started 134 of the Reds’ 135 games through Labor Day.

BY: ABACUS REVEALS

The sports world at large, from pompous pundits to soccer moms, has chosen to take umbrage at the intravenous antics of the San Francisco Giants’ Melky Cabera and Bartolo Colon of the Oakland A’s and brand them as cheats. Each player has accepted a 50-game suspension from MLB for the use of a banned “performance-enhancing” substance detected by an analysis of a urine sample submitted by the player, as per the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Some are offering this as evidence that the sport, while not quite pure, is far cleaner than it has been in recent years and continues to move in the right direction. A recent column by Jayson Stark of ESPN offers considerable data that shows a sharp decline in power numbers since 2005 when Congressional intervention induced the implementation of the random, required urine tests.

But the good vibrations for the effectiveness of the program are hardly unanimous. Positive test results indicate that ballplayers are still, you know, using forbidden pharmaceuticals. Cabrera and his people were even concocting some convoluted cover story, allegedly. A cloud of suspicion continues to hover over the achievements of 2011 National League MVP Ryan Braun of the Milwaukee Brewers, despite the unprecedented reversal-upon-appeal of his suspension for the same offense.

NoCal’s Bay Area is represented in the current conundrum not only by suspended athletes, but also by the voice of Victor Conte. The BALCO buddy of Barry Bonds has re-emerged to opine that MLB’s testing procedures are inadequate, suggesting that as many as half the players are still utilizing banned substances. He even offered his expertise to MLB, via Erik Kuselias of NBC SportsTalk—for free, so as to assuage his conscience, he contends.

The culture of baseball, at all levels of play, is rife with written rules and unwritten conventions. Among the latter is the notion that “If you ain’t cheatin’, you ain’t tryin’.” Coaches carefully parse the language of the rulebook in an attempt to invent new ways to gain a competitive edge—until the rule gets re-written.

Laziness, the lack of hustle, not tryin’, that’s when you should feel shame and offer an apology. Just ask Jimmy Rollins, ManRam or Shoeless Joe Jackson.

But when the umpire is signaling an out, should the fielder who didn’t really make the catch reveal an empty glove, or just “sell” the official’s incorrect ruling?

Catchers are taught to “frame” pitches. What catcher at one time or another has not “pulled” a close pitch onto the corner of the plate?

Nolan Ryan was said to be a master at planting his foot several inches in front of the rubber on the most significant of pitches.

A little cork in the bat, a little scuff to the ball. It’s all part of the mystique of the game, like the hidden-ball trick.

For a century of more, such issues of fairness (as well as safety issues like beanballs and overly aggressive play) were handled internally by the fraternity of players. The outcomes and decisions were pretty universally accepted.

The baseball crisis that required outside intervention involved a team deliberately losing the World Series at the behest of gamblers. But it seems that as long as the competition “between the lines” has been fair and genuine, the culture of the game has been able to police itself—even through issues as thorny as integration, expansion and labor strife.

Almost 60 years after the Black Sox Scandal, Commissioner Bowie Kuhn introduced the phrase “Best Interests of the Game” to the modern sports vernacular. Oakland owner Charlie Finlay, a man ahead of his time if there ever was one, was going about the business of dismantling a championship team while its stars still had value and before any more were lost to free agency. But citing concerns over competitive balance, Kuhn vetoed certain transactions, and in the blink of an eye, lawyers and judges were involved.

Fast forward about a quarter of a century. A brutally contentious labor negotiation had cost baseball a World Series and a fair chunk of its popularity. The good ship MLB was set right, though, by the most dazzling display of power hitting in its long history, as decades-old standards were falling with stunning regularity.

But before long, Commissioner Bud Selig and his three wise monkeys—Speak No Evil (Palmeiro), Speak No English (Sosa), Speak No History (McGuire)—found themselves testifying in Congress, and mandatory drug screening became reality.

Baseball is a game that requires a combination of flexibility, endurance, coordination and reflex. For generations, any kind of weight-training was deemed counter-productive for a baseball player and thus an uncommon practice. Of course, this viewpoint has long been debunked; strength gains do not necessarily inhibit baseball’s pre-requisite skills. Indeed, advances in training and nutrition continue to enhance performance in all our games.

So, too, do advances in medical science enhance sports performance—not to mention longevity and quality of life. (Steroids and HGH do exist as legitimate treatments for genuine maladies, after all.)

That’s the thing about this stuff…it works—in observable and measurable ways. The effect of an improved workout regimen and better diet can likewise be demonstrated.

Consider the string of high-profile athletes who have traipsed off to Europe in the past two or three years to receive some new-fangled blood-spinning treatment. Rave reviews seem to be increasing business. Why Europe? Because this procedure has not been approved for use in the Good Ol’ USA.

Therein lies the problem facing any sports league or anti-doping agency. At what point does the legitimate attempt to improve performance become an unfair advantage deserving of reprimand?

It’s OK for a ballplayer to improve his visual acuity by means of a surgical procedure performed by a certified professional.

But a doctor may not prescribe certain substances (HGH, for example) to treat an injury more effectively and/or expediently. A doctor may not prescribe certain substances which are known to facilitate recuperation from strenuous exertion. (Yet a league will gladly generate advertising revenue from the manufacturers of male-enhancement products. Hmm!)

The rules under which any contest is conducted are established and modified for the purpose of maintaining the integrity of the competition—to give both the offense and defense a fair and reasonable opportunity to succeed. Several years ago boxer Antonio Margarito was discovered to have used a little plaster of Paris while taping his hands for a fight. Talk about a performance enhancing substance, huh? Naturally, the opponent, Boxing Commission and world-at-large cried foul, and Margarito was summarily disqualified and suspended.

In 1999, Barry Bonds played his first season under the influence of unapproved performance enhancers (according to Williams and Fainaru-Wada’s iconic Game of Shadows). Bonds had packed on a very noticeable 15 pounds of upper-body muscle in the off-season through the use of a body-building steroid provided by his trainer and life-long friend, Greg Anderson. The additional muscle mass caused a serious elbow injury that put Bonds on the shelf for nearly two months, as well as nagging problems with his legs. Despite playing only 102 games and posting a paltry .262 batting average, he hit one home run for every 10.4 at-bats, the highest frequency of his career to that point.

Better product and more informed usage, abetted by MLB’s lack of a testing program and Barry’s obsessive drive, then produced “the greatest five consecutive seasons of any hitter in baseball history.” (page 282, Game of Shadows) The Bonds experience shows clearly that (a) performance is indeed enhanced and (b) there are consequences, both short- and long-term, to the use of anabolic steroids.

What’s less clear, though, is whether this is creating an unfair advantage that needs to be outlawed. Is it remotely possible that the supervised use of these pharmaceutical medications is just the next evolutionary step in the development of the game—like the use of fielding gloves, or the invention of the specialized relief pitcher? How will athletes be training in 20 or 50 years? And are not all these “tweaks” introduced for the explicit purpose of enhancing either individual or team performance?

Regarding age and longevity, it is sometimes said 60 is the new 40. (Abacus’ old assets can only hope!) Then Roger Clemens would be the new 36. He might have a few innings left in him after all.

Inventive men like Abner Doubleday and James Naismith would hardly recognize their games as they now are played. Similarly, we are not likely to be too entertained by the games as they were played in their infancy. A fair bit of performance enhancement took place in between.

There are inherent physical risks involved in all our games, even our leisurely-paced national pastime. (Just Google “Tony Conigliaro” if you need a reminder.) The human body was simply not designed for all that exertion, contortion and collision. Can you remember a time when the word “oblique” was an adjective meaning “indirect” rather than a noun meaning “ballplayer’s body part, prone to frequent injury”?

Yet the participants make the decision to play and to excel.

The manner and extent of an athlete’s training is likewise a matter of choice, with its own set of inherent risks and rewards.

While Bay Area baseball fans are sure to be miffed at losing a key contributor to each of their teams in the midst of a drive for the post-season, they need to bear in mind that Melky Cabrera and Bartolo Colon are far more victim than villain in all these shenanigans.

How is it you young folk put it?

Don’t hate the player, hate the Game!

By: Abacus Reveals

Last Friday (Aug. 3), CC Sabathia of the New York Yankees recorded his second complete game of the 2012 season, the 35th (in 374 starts) of his impressive and highly profitable 12 year career. CC’s lived up to his reputation as a workhorse this season, despite a brief stint on the Disabled List, providing manager Joe Girardi with at least seven innings of work in 13 of his 19 starting assignments. That 68 percent rate of Long Starts ranks fourth in the majors currently.

Sabathia’s was MLB’s 87th complete game this season. In 2011, CG #87 was notched six weeks sooner, on June 19, when Tiger MVP Justin Verlander, Jason Vargas of Seattle and Tampa Bay’s “Big Game” James Shields (who was best in baseball last year with 11 CG’s) all turned the trick.

At the current pace, MLB pitching will amass 136 complete games, equaling the total of 2008—and that is the second lowest total EVER. Even the labor-ravaged season of 1994 produced over 100 more than that paltry output.

2011 had shown an increase in CG’s for the fifth consecutive year to 173, but that would have been barely a good month throughout most of the history of professional baseball. One hundred years ago, in 1912, 16 pitching staffs combined for 1,431 complete games. In 1928, there were 1,172 CG’s; in 1948, 797. (In those years, an MLB season was comprised of 1,232 games, compared to the 2,430 games played with today’s contingent of 30 teams.)

1968’s “Year of the Pitcher” saw Denny McLain’s 31 wins, Bob Gibson’s 1.12 ERA and 889 CG’s. (’68, by the way, is one of only two seasons in baseball’s long history when the MVP’s of both leagues were pitchers, the 1924 showing of Brooklyn’s Dazzy Vance and the Senators’ Walter Johnson being the only other occasion.) There were over 1,000 CG’s in 1978, 622 in 1988 and 371 in 1993.

From 1995-2003, only one season saw fewer than 200 complete games (2001’s 194 the exception), but the pendulum was already in motion, with total CG’s bottoming out at 112 in 2007.

So, where have all the complete games gone?

Professional baseball has expanded and evolved with the times in its near century and a half of existence. As designated hitters, divisional playoffs, quality starts, wild cards, pitch counts and all manner of specialization have joined in the game, the role of and expectations for a pitcher no longer seem to include finishing what you start.

Certainly the increasing tendency for teams to rely on statistical analysis and situational substitutions accounts in part for this strategic change. Before sailing off into retirement last year, didn’t Tony LaRussa micro-manage his Cardinals to a World Series title over a Texas Ranger pitching staff crafted in the image and likeness of Nolan Ryan (he of the 222 career complete games)? Perhaps the “copy-cat” nature of professional sports in general also has contributed to this season’s reduction in CG’s.

But this paucity of complete games seems more than simply a trend. Consider our current so-called “iron men”: former Cy Young winner Felix Hernandez has completed 21 of his career 228 starts; current MLB leader Verlander, who has six CG’s, is 20 for 221 in his career; Shields, last year’s Mr. Automatic with 23 of his 33 starts lasting at least seven innings, has 17 CG’s in 206 overall starting assignments. Shields’s teammate David Price (3-111) and Tim Lincecum of the Giants (8-178) need bullpen assistance in over 95 percent of their outings.

Philadelphia ace Roy Halladay is the current king of the finishing starters with 66 CG’s in 367 games, a percentage comparable to Hall of Fame-bound Greg Maddux. But this rate, roughly 15 percent, pales next to Maddux’s contemporary “Blackjack” Morris (175-527) and the Yankee great of the ‘50’s and ‘60’s Whitey Ford (156-438), who chalked up CG’s twice as frequently. Morris (5-13) and Ford (an impressive seven complete games in his 22 World Series starts) maintained this pace in the postseason.

However, it is Mr. Gibson’s record of endurance that stands out most. Not only did he throw both the first and last of his team’s pitches in 53 percent (255-482) of his regular season starts, he pitched 81 of the 82 innings in his nine World Series appearances, good for a 7-2 record and two rings. Interestingly, Gibby lost his final World Series contest, Game 7 in 1968, to the Detroit Tigers and Mickey Lolich, who was throwing his third CG of that series despite working on two days’ rest. (Gibson had won Game 7 of the 1964 Fall Classic over the Yankees under the same circumstances.) Eight complete game, one covering 10 innings, in nine tries—Wow!

The sports wisdom of the ages contends that momentum in baseball is to be found in “tomorrow’s” starting pitcher.

If so, then momentum in modern baseball has a shelf-life of only five or six innings.